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An  Econometric  Evaluation of
Stabilization  Policies  for the
U.  S.  Grain Market
Enrique R.  Arzac
This paper evaluates  stabilization policies by applying methods  of stochastic control
and dynamic analysis to an econometric model of the U.S.  grain market.  Its main results
are:  (1) the aggregate  consumer  and producer surplus generated  by the model  is insensi-
tive  to the choice  of the market regime;  (2) policies directed to stabilize prices at levels
compatible  with  nondecreasing  farm  revenue  require  the  management  of  both  grain
inventories  and domestic supply;  (3) price fluctuations  are  significantly less under opti-
mal stabilization than in the unregulated version of the model; and (4) historical policies
have  destabilizing  effects  on the market  model.
How to stabilize  grain prices,  if at all,  is an
old  but  still  unsolved  policy  problem.  The
present paper studies this matter by applying
methods  of stochastic  control  and  dynamic
analysis  to an  annual econometric  model  of
the  U.S.  grain  market.  This  approach  has
several  advantages  over  more  traditional
analyses  of grain  market regulation:l  (1)  it is
based  upon a  model  of the  market  that  ex-
plains  the  underlying  dynamic  phenomena;
(2)  the model takes into account feedback  ef-
fects  due  to  supply  and  private  stock  re-
sponse to stabilization efforts;  (3) the decision
rules  used  in  the  analysis  are  optimal  with
respect  to  explicit  welfare  criteria;  and  (4)
measures  of stochastic  dynamic performance
offer  a  clear  cut  comparison  of alternative
market  regimes.  Most  previous  studies  are
based upon historical  trend analysis  or upon
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simulation.  Most  simulation  studies  use  ad
hoc  specifications  rather  than  a  statistically
estimated market  model.
An Annual Model of  the U.S.  Grain Market
Structural Equations
The model  is based upon received  theory
and the insights provided by previous studies
[Cromarty;  Egbert;  Houck  and  Ryan;  and
Nerlove,  in  particular].  The  individual
equations  are  presented  in  Table  1,  which
includes  the  estimated  regression  coeffi-
cients, the ratio of each regression coefficient
to its standard error,  the multiple correlation
coefficient  (R2)2,  the  Durbin-Watson  statis-
tics  (DW)  of the  supply  equations,  and  the
1See,  for example,  Fox  and Wells;  Gustafson;  Waugh;
Tweeten,  Kalbfleish,  and  Lu;  Bailey,  Kutish  and
Rojko;  Hillman,  Johnson  and  Gray;  Ray  and  Moriak;
and  the  papers  presented  at  the  1976  ORSA-TIMS
Conference  on  the  Systems  Analysis  of  Grain  Re-
serves,  compiled by  Eaton and  Steele.  Contributions
which  apply  optimal  control  theory  to  agriculture
econometric  models  include:  Rausser  and  Freebairn;
Talpaz  and Taylor;  and Arzac  and  Wilkinson  (1979b).
The  state of the subject is surveyed  in Rausser.
2We  report the  R
2 statistic  for two-stage-least  squares
results. The high value of R
2 is an unambiguous  indica-
tion of good fit even when  its  range is (-oo,  1].
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first-order  autocorrelation  coefficients  (p)  of
the disturbances in the simultaneous  block of
consumption  and  inventory  equations.  The
variables  are:  ci  =  domestic  consumption  (i
=  1 for wheat and i  = 2 for feed grain prices);
si  =  domestic  commercial  inventories  at the
end of the crop year; qi = domestic supply; e,
=  net commercial  exports;  fi  =  concessional
exports;  mi =  government  stocks  at the  end
of the crop year; pi =  average market price (i
=  3  for  soybeans);  7ri  =  weighted  support
price; di = weighted acreage diversion rate; n
=  U.S.  disposable  income  per capita  for the
calendar  year (mill.  1958dol.);  wi =  index  of
weather conditions;  t  =  time  index  (t  =  47,
48,  ... ); and 8  = dummy variable,  8  =  1 for
1947-48 and 1973-75,  and 8 =  0 for 1949-72.
Domestic  consumption,  commercial  in-
ventories,  domestic  supply  and  the  market
prices of wheat and feed grains  are endogen-
ous.  Exports,  government  stocks,  support
prices,  diversion  rates,  disposable  income,
weather  and a time trend are exogenous.
Quantities are expressed in million bushels
and  correspond  to  crop  years.  Feed  quan-
tities  include  corn,  grain  sorghum,  barley
and  oats,  and  are  expressed  in corn  equiva-
lents  obtained  using  1962  relative  market
prices  as  weights.  Prices  are  expressed  in
cents of 1967 per bushel.  Support and diver-
sion  rates  are  weighted  by the  restrictions
imposed  on program  participants  as in Ryan
and  Abel.  Feed  grain prices  are aggregated
using  the  fractions  of  1962  total  feed grain
output  as  weights.  The  indexes  of weather
conditions  are the  ratios  of actual  to normal
yields  per  acre  which,  as  in  Egbert,  follow
quadratic  trends.
Equations  (1) and (2) are partially  reduced
demand for grain equations which attempt to
take  into  account  the  determinants  of
equilibrium  in  final  and  intermediate  food
markets.  These equations  can be interpreted
as representing  a partial adjustment  process
with  equilibrium  demand  determined  by
current  and  lagged  market  prices,  real  dis-
posable income per capita,  and a time trend.3
Equations  (1) and (2)  can  also  be justified  in
terms  of  the  following  alternative,  perhaps
more  satisfactory  model:  demand  for  food,
Df, is a function of current food price, Pf, and
shift variables,  Z. Supply of food, Sf, depends
on the lagged prices  of food and grain.4 De-
mand for grain,  Dg,  is a derived demand with
supply of food and the current price of grain,
Pg,  as arguments.  That is,
(7)Df= Df(Pf,  Z)
Sf =  Sf(Pf,_l,  Pg,-)
Dg =  Dg(Sf,  Pg),
where  all functions  are assumed to be linear
in the variables.  Upon substituting Sf into (7)
and using the food market clearing condition,
Df_,  = Sf_1 to  solve for Pf_,  and eliminate  it
from (7) one obtains
(8)Dg=  Dg(Pg,  Pg,_,  Pg,_2,  Pf,-2,  Z_1).
After  successive  substitutions  to  eliminate
Pf,-2,  Pf_,,  ..  ., (8) becomes  a function of in-
finite distributed lags  with geometrically  de-
clining  weights  in  grain  prices  and the  shift
variables,  which can be rewritten in the form
of equations  (1) and  (2).5 The  reduced  form
specification  of  grain  consumption  permits
studying grain price fluctuations without hav-
ing to model and estimate the livestock mar-
3Because of collinearity,  the effect of population cannot
be  separated  from  the negative  trend which  is  partly
due  to  changes  in  taste  and  processing  technology.
Previous  studies  of  U.S.  grain and  food  consumption
have  faced a  similar difficulty.  For example,  Tweeten
(p.  351) excludes  population  effects and  explicitly  al-
lows for a trend.  Cromarty (pp. 562-563) does not use a
trend,  but  his  model ignores  population  and contains
apparently unwarranted  regressors  in lieu  of trend.
4This  is  particularly  true of livestock production  where
the supply of meat depends on previous breeding deci-
sions based  upon previous  prices.  See Arzac  and Wil-
kinson (1979a).
5See  Johnston  (pp.  300-303),  for  example.  Strictly,
equations  (1) and (2)  are  an  approximation  to  this for-
mulation  because  they  include  current  income  only,
rather  than a distributed lag  on this variable,  and the
disturbances  are  assumed  to  follow  simple first-order
serial  correlation.
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ket.  The  price  of  this  simplification  is  not
small,  however,  since  no  direct  information
about  livestock  market  fluctuations  can  be
provided. 6
The  specification  of the rest of the model
is  straightforward.  The  private  inventory
equations (3) and  (4) are a function of current
prices and government stocks.  Futures prices
and  lagged  spot  prices  are  not included  fol-
lowing  Working's  observation  that  the  spot
price of a commodity with continuous  storage
such  as  grain  contains  all  the relevant  infor-
mation.  Tomek  and  Gray  have  further  de-
veloped  and  tested  this  notion.  See  also
Labys and Granger  (Ch. 4).  Grain  supply de-
pends  on expected  prices  at  planting  time,
weather conditions and technological  change.
Expected  prices  are  functions  of  market
prices at planting time when these are above
support  rates.  Otherwise,  government  pro-
grams  determine  the  farmers'  expected
prices  as  in  Houck  and  Ryan.  The  market
price of soybeans  is included in the feed grain
supply  equation because  soybeans  are a pro-
duction  substitute  for  feed  grains  [Houck,
Ryan  and Subotnik].
Equations  (1) through  (4) were  estimated
with 1947-73 data by a two-stage  least square
procedure  for  simultaneous  equations  with
autoregressive  residuals  [Fair]. 7 Equations
(5) and (6)  were estimated with  1947-75  data
by ordinary  least squares.  The  dummy vari-
able  8  used in these equations  distinguishes
those  years when  supply  responded  to  mar-
ket  prices  (6  =  1) from  those  years  when
supply  responded  to  government  programs
(8  =  0).
Price and income elasticities are smaller in
the  case  of wheat  consumption,  consistent
with the fact that the latter is mostly derived
from  general  food demand,  while feed  grain
6For estimation and analysis  of the livestock market  see
Arzac  and  Wilkinson  (1979a,  1979b).
7The  specification  of the  demand equations  in  the  si-
multaneous  block implies  autocorrelated  disturbances
[Johnston  (pp.  300-303)].  The  system  is  identifiable
even  in  the  presence  of  autocorrelation:  it  satisfies
Fisher's  (pp.  168-175)  condition  as  well  as  the  usual
rank  condition  for identifiability  (ibid. pp.  21-36).
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consumption is mostly derived from fed meat
demand.8 General  food demand  is  less price
and  income  elastic  than  fed  meat  demand
[Tweeten and Arzac  and Wilkinson  (1979a)].
The cross-price  elasticity of wheat consump-
tion is also larger,  reflecting the sensitivity of
wheat feeding  to the wheat-feed  grain price
relationship.
The  acreage  diversion  rate  was  excluded
from the feed grain supply equations because
it had a positive  and insignificant  coefficient
which changed erratically with the size of the
sample.  We  concluded  that,  in  spite  of  its
apparent effect  on corn  acreage  [Houck  and
Ryan],  the  effect  of acreage  diversion  pro-
grams on total feed grain output was negligi-
ble. This may be due to the fact that the pro-
grams applied  mainly to corn and,  in several
years,  admitted planting other feed grains  in
acreage  diverted from  corn.  Another  reason
has been given  by D.  G.  Johnson (pp. 34-35)
who points out that,  since the features of the
grain programs  were  changed on the basis of
anticipated  market  conditions,  it is  very  dif-
ficult  to  distinguish  between  the  effects  of
acreage  diversion  and  market  conditions.
Lagged  output was not found to be a statisti-
cally  significant  explanatory  variable  for
either  grain  and  had  the  wrong  sign  in  the
feed equation,  suggesting  that  postwar  sup-
ply  response  is  not  subject  to  delayed  ad-
justment.  Finally,  we  note  that,  while  ag-
gregating  over  feed  grains  might  have
masked the effect of price on supply, the re-
sults of this paper are not sensitive to signifi-
cant  increases  in the price  elasticity of feed
supply. 9
8The  short-run  elasticities  of consumption  at  sample
means are:
Cross
Price  Price Income
Wheat  -. 23  .13  .71
Feed
Grain  -. 63  .052  1.14
Long-run  elasticities  are about  twice  as large.
°The elasticities  of supply at sample  means  are:
Market  Support  Soybean  Diversion
Price  Price  Price  Rate
Wheat  .38  .25  --  -. 079
Feed
Grain  .16 .11  -.04
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Reduced Form Fit and Ex-post
Forecasting  Performance
The  reduced form of the model (i.e.,  cur-
rent  endogenous  variables  as  functions  of
predetermined  variables)  was  derived  from
the  structural  equations  of Table  1 and  its
performance  evaluated  over  the  sample
period  and  a  one  year  ex-post  forecast.' 0
Theil's  (pp.  31-46) normalized  mean-squared
error  (U) and the multiple correlation coeffi-
cient  (R 2) between  actual  and predicted  val-
ues were computed.  The ranges  of U and R 2
were  [.01,  .08]  and [.84,  .94],  respectively.
As  expected,  consumption  and  output  per-
formed better than stocks and prices,  but the
model tracked recent stock and price fluctua-
tions quite well.
Exogenous variables
The evaluation  of stabilization  policies  re-
quires  making  assumptions  about  the  be-
havior of the  exogenous variables.  Grain  ex-
ports,  which  were  not  found  to  respond  to
prices in this study (perhaps because  of their
pronounced  dependency  on  weather  and
government  policies  in  the  rest  of  the
world, 11)  are assumed to be a function of pre-
vious  exports  and  a time trend,  with  distur-
bances following first-order serial correlation
to allow  for  possible  movements  in phase  of
omitted  variables.  The  following  export
equations  are estimated  by generalized  least
squares with  1947-72  data:
(9)  el =  -342.4  +  .6748 e,_  +  7.22 t,
(-1.98)  (2.10)  (2.10)
p  =  -. 627,  R2 =  .423,
(10)  e2 =  -877.0  +  .6826 e2,-  +  17.63 t,
(-1.80)  (2.80)  (1.85)
p  =  -. 010.  R2 =  .826.
1°The  ex-post  forecast  periods  are  1975/76-1976/77  for
supply,  and  1974/75-1975/76  for  the  rest.  Ex-post
forecasts  are  based  upon  data  reported  in  the  No-
vember  1976  issues  of Wheat  Situation and  Feed
Situation.
Per capita disposable income is assumed to
grow  at  the  average  rate  observed  during
1947-72,  and the soybean  price  is fixed  at its
1947-75 average.  Data for 1947-75 were used
to estimate the means  and covariance  matrix
of the weather indexes.
The  Stochastic  Dynamics  of
The  Unregulated  Market
We now consider the stability and stochas-
tic  dynamic  behavior  of  the  unregulated
market  as  characterized  by  the  model  of
Table 1. The effects of government interven-
tion are eliminated by letting m,  =  m2 =  0 in
(3) and (4),  and 8 =  1 in (5) and (6).  Further-
more,  export  equations  (9)  and  (10)  are  ap-
pended to the model. The resulting system is
stable.  That is,  the characteristic  roots of the
reduced-form  coefficient  matrix  of  lagged
endogenous  variables  have  moduli  less  than
one. 12 Complex  and  negative  characteristic
roots contribute damped cycle components of
5.1  and 2  years, respectively,  to the paths of
the endogenous  variable.  When activated  by
random fluctuations,  these cycle components
produce  sustained  cyclical behavior.  In fact,
taking  into  account  the  disturbances  of
weather,  exports  and  the  endogenous  var-
iables,  one  can  compute  the  steady-state
standard  deviations  and the  expected  times
between  successive  relative  maxima  of  the
time  series  (the  latter  are  measures  of  the
average  length  of cyclical  fluctuations,  see
Chow (1975,  pp. 47-48)). These measures are
presented  in Table  2,  which  shows  that  the
model exhibits  2.7 to 3.7 year cycles  similar
llMeasurement  errors  in  foreign  data  and  the
heterogeneity of grain  importing countries might  also
be responsible for our inability  to observe a price elas-
tic demand for exports.  Disaggregated estimation over
groups of countries might make grain exports partially
endogenous.  The foreign data problem is discussed  in
Hooper  and  Underwood,  who report  preliminary  es-
timates of aggregate  grain export equations with insig-
nificant  price coefficients.
1 The procedure  for writing  a linear  system  with auto-
correlated  residuals  in  first-order form  is discussed  in
Chow [1975,  pp.  21-22 and 61-63].
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TABLE 2.  Stochastic Behavior  of the  Unregulated  Market  Model
Level  Standard  Cycle length
Variablea  in 1974/75  deviation  in years
Wheat consumption  683  66  3.54
Feed grain consumption  4779  383  3.74
Wheat commercial  stocks  318  182  2.73
Feed  grain commercial  stocks  558  282  3.06
Wheat  price  248  93  2.66
Feed grain  price  167  28  2.96
Wheat supply  1793  265  2.64
Feed grain  supply  5931  491  2.83
Wheat  exports  1037  151  2.70
Feed  grain exports  1403  198  3.61
aQuantities are  expressed  in million bushels and prices in cents of 1967.
to those reported for most economic  variables
in the business  cycle literature.
The standard deviation of feed grain prices
is substantially  smaller than the standard  de-
viation  of wheat  prices,  which  agrees  with
casual  observation  and  suggests  that  wheat
prices will  demand the  greatest  stabilization
effort.  Further insights into the dynamic  be-
havior of the model are  given by the implied
power  spectra  of exports  and  prices  pre-
sented  in Figure  1, which measure  the con-
tribution of the random periodic components
of different  frequencies  to the total  variance
of  the  series.  [Chow  (1975,  pp.  78-80  and
85-87)].  Wheat  exports  have  more  power
than  feed grain  exports at  high  frequencies.
Furthermore, the spectrum of wheat prices is
above  that  of  feed  grain  prices  throughout
the  frequency  domain and  increases  at  high
frequencies,  indicating  distinct  short cycles.
The partial coherences  of prices with exports
(not reported here)  show that both short and
long term export  fluctuations  have strong ef-
fects  on wheat  prices,  but only  mild effects
on feed grain prices.13
The Stochastic  Control Problem
Control  theory provides  a  natural  charac-
terization  of optimal  government  policy:  a
feedback  control  function  to  steer  the  eco-
13Details  are given in Arzac.  The partial coherence  is the
squared  partial  correlation  coefficient  between  the
same frequency  components  of two  series [Labys  and
Granger,  pp.  54-56].
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nomic  system toward  desired targets.  In the
model  of  this paper  endogenous  prices  and
quantities  are  functions  of  such  exogenous
variables as  income, weather and commercial
exports,  and  of  such  policy  instruments  as
government  stocks, concessional exports,  and
support prices.  Uncertainty,  due to equation
disturbances  and to the stochastic behavior of











Figure  1.  Power  spectra  of  grain  exports
and  free  market  prices.
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mality in terms of the expected value of some
criterion.  Two alternative criteria are consid-
ered in this paper:  (1) The expected domestic
surplus,  defined  as  the  area  under  the  de-
mand curves,  minus the area under the sup-
ply curves,  plus export  revenues,  minus  the
cost of private and government inventories;1 4
and  (2) a weighted sum  of mean-squared-de-
viations  of selected  variables  from  their pre-
specified  targets.  As  in  the  macroeconomic
stabilization literature  (see  Chow (1975)  and
Pindyck  for  example),  weights  and  targets
will be varied in order to derive and evaluate
alternative  stabilization  policies.
In  order  to  state and  relate  the  stochastic
control problems corresponding to the above
criteria  one notes  that  the  reduced  form  of
the market model plus the equations describ-
ing the  paths  assumed  for  the  uncontrolled
exogenous  variables  can  be  compactly  writ-
ten as
(11) Yt  =  Ayt-1  +  Cxt  +  Et,
with given  initial condition yo, where yt is the
vector of all endogenous  and exogenous  var-
iables  and  autocorrelated  disturbances,  xt  is
the vector of the exogenous variables used as
policy instruments  and Et  is the vector of un-
correlated  disturbances.  A  and C  are  coeffi-
cients  matrices (see footnote  12).
Using the structural  form  of the model  to
compute the surplus areas and approximating
storage costs by a quadratic function,  one ob-
tains the following quadratic  surplus function
(12)
T
E  c  a t yKyt,
t=  1
where E is the expectation operator,  a E (0,  1]
is a discount factor,  t = 1,  . . ., T is the control
period and K  is a negative  definite  matrix of
coefficients.  y  t  is the transpose  of Yt.
On the other hand, the quadratic  specifica-
tion of criterion  (2) is
14Note that the international surplus is not defined in the
absence of price elastic export demand  functions.
T
(13)  E E (y  - at)  '  Kt(yt-  at),
t=l
where at is a target vector for period t, and Kt
is  a  positive  definite  matrix  of  assigned
weights. Chow (1975, pp. 156-180) has shown
that  the  minimum  of  (13)  subject  to  (11)
is the linear feedback  function
(14) Xt  =  Gt Yt-1  +  gt,
where  Gt and gt satisfy a system of difference
equations.  Moreover,  we  note  that the  sur-
plus  maximization  problem  (maximize  (12)
subject  to  (11))  can  be  solved  as  a  loss
minimization  problem  by  simply  letting  at
= 0 and Kt  =  -a tK  in  (13).
Welfare  Optimal Regulation  Versus
The  Unregulated Market
Does  private  inventory  holding maximize
expected  domestic  surplus,  or are  there  sig-
nificant welfare  gains to be attained by com-
plementary  government  regulation  of grain
stocks?  To  answer  this  question  we  derive
surplus-maximizing  policies  (criterion  (12))
using  government  stocks  as  sole  policy  in-
struments,  and  compare  their  performance
against the unregulated market version of the
model.
The elements of K are computed  in Arzac
using Hotelling's  surplus measure for related
commodities.  Storage costs are approximated
using data provided by Schienbein for the cost
of storage  at commercial elevators.  Short-run
marginal costs (2.61 cents of 1967 per bu.) are
his  variable  costs  minus  taxes.  Long-run
marginal  costs  (6.77  cents  per  bu.)  are  his
replacement costs minus taxes.  The quadratic
storage  cost  functions  are  assumed to  attain
their minima at the carryover level observed
at  the  end  of  1972,  that  is,  at  294  million
bushels (m.bu.) of wheat and  1103 m.bu.  of
feed  grains.  These values  are assumed to be
the points where  the unobservable  marginal
"convenience yield" of processors and traders
equates the marginal cost of physical  storage.
Full long-run marginal costs of physical  stor-
15
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age  are  attained  at the  carryover  capacity  of
the  economy,  which  is assumed to be  equal
to the maximum carryovers  observed  during
the postwar period:  1411 m.bu.  of wheat and
3000  m.bu.  of feed grains  in 1960.  We note
that  the  results  reported  in  this  section  are
not dependent upon the crude approximation
to the storage  cost function  implied by these
assumptions.
Optimal  steady-state  policies,  approxi-
mated by the tenth iteration on the optimal-
ity  conditions,  are  used  to  characterize  the
optimally regulated market.  They correspond
to an  infinite horizon  and  are  not subject  to
truncation  effects.  Expected trajectories  are
computed iteratively using the reduced form
of the  model  with and  without  the  control
equations.  Expected  surplus  is  computed
using a formula developed by Chow (1975,  p.
167).
The expected trajectories are not reported.
They show that the regulated market tends to
accumulate  larger wheat  inventories  and  in-
crease prices.  But higher export revenues are
offset  by  lower  domestic  consumption  and
higher inventory costs. In fact,  in spite of the
assumption of price inelastic  exports which is
biased  against  the unregulated  market,  the
latter  performs  almost  as  well  as  the  regu-
lated  market  in  terms  of expected  surplus.
The expected  surplus  per year is  $84.05 bil-
lion in  1967 dollars for the unregulated  mar-
ket and $84.97 billion under the optimal pol-
icy corresponding to no discounting (a =  1 in
(12)).
The yearly surplus should not be compared
to the value  of annual  output  of wheat  and
feed grains.  In fact,  because of the low price
elasticities  of  the  demand  for  grain,  the
surplus  is  about  four  times  as  large  as  the
value  of output.  The  present  value  of  the
surplus generated  over ten years  (discounted
at ten percent) is  $502.4 billion in the unreg-
ulated  market  and  $510.2 billion under  the
optimal policy  corresponding  to ten percent
discounting (a = (1.1)- 1 in (12)).  These differ-
ences 6f about  one percent  in the  surpluses
generated by the two regimes seem small and
are likely to be within the margin of error of
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the  present  study.  Moreover,  the  unregu-
lated market  continues  to perform  almost  as
well as the optimally regulated market under
significant changes in the market model  and
the welfare  function,  including a ten-fold  in-
crease  in storage  costs,  a three-fold  increase
in the feed grain price coefficient of the feed
grain supply equation  (see footnote  9),  and a
two-fold lengthening  of the horizon.
The  unregulated  market  is  not unique  in
approximating  the  performance  of  optimal
regulation.  Changes in the coefficients  of the
optimal  policies  did  not  produce  significant
departures  either,  suggesting  that  expected
surplus is rather insensitive to the form of the
inventory  policy.  Policy  makers  might  then
be able to pursue  such goals as price stability
and farm  income maintenance without incur-
ring significant aggregate welfare  costs.  This
possibility  is examined  in  the following  sec-
tion.
Optimal  Stabilization  Policies
Stabilization Through
Inventory Management
In  this  section  optimal  price  stabilization
policies  are  obtained  and  compared  to  the
unregulated market.  The loss function  (13) is
adopted  as  a criterion.  Target  prices are  set
above  the declining trends  produced  by the
unregulated  market  in order to force  stabili-
zation  policies to maintain  farm income.  The
latter is perhaps the  most binding constraint
faced  by policymakers  (the  last  column  of
Table  3  below  shows that  farm revenue  de-
creases  in the unregulated market).  The pur-
pose of this experiment is to find out if a grain
stock policy can reduce price fluctuations and
maintain  farm  income without  requiring ex-
cessive  inventories  and  without  decreasing
aggregate  surplus.
Several  alternative  stabilization  policies
are  considered.  Policy  1  is  obtained  by
minimizing  the  sum  of  the  yearly  mean-
squared  deviations  (MSD)  of prices  from
their  1972  levels  (178.2  cents  for wheat  and
126.2  for  feed  grains).  As  expected  from  a
policy  attempting  to  maintain  prices  above
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their free-market  level but  subject to no in-
ventory  penalty,  this policy requires  a large
accumulation  of stocks.  As  Table  3  shows  it
succeeds  in tracking the price targets but av-
erage  government  inventories  are  3129 mil-
lion bushels (m.bu.)  of wheat and 3775 m.bu.
of feed grains.
Policies  2 and 3 attempt to reduce the  ex-
pected  size  and  variance  of government  in-
ventories  by introducing  the weighted MSD
of  their  levels  about  zero  in  the  criterion
function,  with weights equal to .001  in policy
2  and .0001  in  policy 3.  Policy  2 reduces ex-
pected inventory levels but fails to obtain the
price  targets.  Policy  3  approaches  the price
targets  but  requires  an  average  wheat  in-
ventory  of 2648 m.bu.
The  results  of additional  experimentation
agree  with the  implications of policies  2 and
3:  maintaining wheat prices near the level of
1972 with stocks as sole instruments requires
an  excessive  accumulation  of  wheat  in-
ventories.  An alternative price target equal to
140 cents per bushel of wheat is  used in de-
riving  policy  4.  Under  this  policy  average
wheat stocks are  1759 m.bu. and the average
wheat price is  124 cents.  The last column of
Table  3  shows  that  policy  4  maintains  farm
revenue.
From the penultimate  column of Table 3,
we conclude  that price support and stabiliza-
tion policies do not reduce  aggregate  surplus
in  the  present  model.  The  stabilization  gain
attained  by  policies  1  through  4  is  very
modest,  however.  In fact, the standard devia-
tion of wheat price  under optimal control  is
only  17 percent below its free-market  value.
One  reason  is  that  inventory  management
has so far been based upon previous year in-
formation.  The  stabilization  gain  attained by
policies  which  make  use  of current  year  in-
formation  will be considered below.
Stabilization Through Inventory
Control and Grain Disposals
We now  introduce two  new policy instru-
ments  (one  for  each  grain)  which  enter  the
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disposals  of excess  grain.  Disposals  can  be
interpreted  as concessional exports or as sup-
ply  reductions.  Under  the  first  interpreta-
tion,  the  revenue  from  concessional  exports
is  assumed  to  be  negligible.  Furthermore,
these  exports  are  assumed  to  go  to  seg-
mented  markets  which  do not  interact  with
the  commercial  export  market.  Of course,  a
set of refined  export  equations  would  make
this  last  assumption  unnecessary  (see  foot-
note  11).  Alternatively,  the  optimal disposal
levels  can  be  attained  by  reducing  supply
through  supply-related  instruments  (support
prices  and  the  diversion  rate  appearing  in
equations  (5) and (6)).
Target  prices  are  set  at  their  1972 levels.
Positive  targets  are  assigned  to  inventories
and  disposals  to  penalize  relatively  more
negative  deviations  since  now,  given  the
increase in the number of instruments,  main-
taining prices on the high side is not sufficient
to  force  the  instruments  to assume  positive
values.  The  targets  are:  400  million  bushels
(m.bu.) for wheat  stocks,  300 m.bu.  for feed
grain  stocks,  400  m.bu.  for  wheat  disposals
and 200 m.bu.  for feed grain disposals.
Three stabilization  policies are considered.
Policy 5 assigns weights  1, .001  and .00005 to
the  MSD of prices,  stocks  and disposals,  re-
spectively.  Policies 6 and 7 assign weights  1,
.002 and  .005,  respectively.  Their statistical
implications  are  presented  in  Table  3.
Policies  5  and  6  reduce  the  standard  de-
viations  of prices almost  as much as  policy 1
but  require  much  smaller  expected  in-
ventories  - in  the  200-300  m.bu.  range.
This  is  due  to the  use of disposals,  the  ex-
pected level of which is in the 200-400 m.bu.
range.  Disposals  maintain prices  above  their
free-market  level,  but  their  large  standard
deviations  indicate  that they are  also  largely
responsible for stabilization in the case of pol-
icy  5.  This may not be desirable  if disposals
are concessional exports,  or may not be feasi-
ble  if  they  are  supply  reductions.  A  more
balanced  alternative  is  offered  by  policy  6
where  both  inventories  and  disposals  share
responsibility  for  stabilization.  Further  re-
ductions  of the standard  deviations  of dispo-
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sals  can  be  obtained  by  increasing  their
weights in the loss function.  Policy 7 adjusts
the instruments  according to information  re-
garding  current  supply  and  export  distur-
bances.  As expected,  it results in more active
intervention  and  attains  significant  reduc-
tions  in  the  standard  deviations  of  both
prices.
One  notes  that the  surpluses  obtained  by
policies  5  and  6  are  slightly  above  that  ob-
tained by the surplus maximization inventory
policy  of  the  preceding  section.  By  using
grain  disposals,  policies  5  and  6  maintain
prices  above  their  free-market  level  with
small inventory costs.  Moreover,  the  surplus
figures  of Table  3  do  not  give  any  value  to
disposals.  Interpreting  disposals  as  supply
reductions  lowers  supply costs  by about one
billion  dollars  and  increases  the  surplus  to
about  86 billion  dollars  per year.  Additional
computations indicated that this figure  is also
attainable  by a surplus maximizing inventory
and disposal  policy,  or  by  the  free  market
when  the  export  equations  (9)  and  (10)  are
modified  to make  exports  as price  elastic  as
domestic  consumption.
Evaluation of  Historical Policies
Postwar  agricultural  policy  has  attempted
to  maintain  prices  above  their  free-market
equilibrium by a combination of supply man-
agement,  concessional  exports,  and  passive
inventory holding.  Table  4 presents  ordinary
least squares estimates  of linear government
reaction functions for support prices,  acreage
diversion  rates,  concessional  exports  and in-
ventories.  Admittedly,  characterizing  more
than  two  decades  of heterogeneous  policies
by simple linear equations  is a gross simplifi-
cation.  Still, the reaction functions of Table 4
have  suggestive  implications  which  seem
worth a brief comment.
In order to evaluate the effects of historical
policies on the performance of the grain mar-
ket  model,  equations  (15)  through  (17)  are
substituted into the supply  equations (5) and
(6)  with  6  =  0  to  obtain  supply  behavior
under  government  supply management,  (18)
and (19)  are used as the control equations  for
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TABLE 4.  Observed  Government  Reaction  Functions
R
2




(16)  T2  =  -13.07  + .8710  P2 -1
(-.90)  (8.21)
(17)  d 1 =  14.35  + .1481  Pi,-
(-.84)  (1.62)
(18)  hi  =  3.96 + .1175  91,-1  + .7669 fl,_
(.09)  (2.98)  (6.87)
(19)  h2 =  50.3  + .0173 g2,-1  + .2900 f2,-
(1.97)  (.87)  (1.31)
(20)  g  - g,-1  =  110.2 - 1.360  pi + 2.150 7r1 + 1.733 d 1
(.53)  (-1.67)  (2.76)  (.69)
(21)  92 - 92,-1  =  -330.0  - 3.760  P2 + 10.58 72 + .5094 d 2
(-.72)  (-.62)  (2.40)  (.11)
concessional  exports,  and  (20)  and  (21)  are
used as the control equations for government
inventories.  The  statistical  implications  of
these  reaction  functions  over  a  ten  year
period starting in 1975-76 are included at the
bottom of Table 3.  By reducing supply, they
maintain  prices  above  the free-market  level
with  small  inventories  and  concessional  ex-
ports. In fact, expected wheat supply remains
at the low  level  of 1854 m.bu.  at the end  of
the 10 year period in spite of the technologi-
cal advance  assumed in the  supply function.
It is noteworthy that historical policies result
in  standard  deviations  of prices  and  in-
ventories that are even larger than those pro-
duced  by the  free  market.15 Their  expected
surplus,  however,  is  about  the same  as  that
produced by policies 5  and 6 when disposals
are treated  as  supply reductions.
Stochastic  Dynamic  Behavior  of  Prices
Figure  2  exhibits  the  power  spectra  of
prices produced by the three market regimes
considered  in  this  paper.  The  spectrum  of
wheat price shows that while the unregulated
market  produces  oscillations  (high power  at
15This  is  so  in spite of the  fact that the  variances  of the
estimated  functions  are  ignored  here.  In  particular,
government  inventories,  not being under active  man-
agement,  were  subject to  considerable  random  varia-











high frequencies),  historical  regulation  mag-
nifies long cycles  (high power at low frequen-
cies).  On  the  other  hand,  optimal  stabiliza-
tion reduces the power spectrum  over all the
frequency domain.  Policy 6  reduces  the fre-
quency of oscillations  to the level attained by
postwar  regulation  while  maintaining  the
more  stable performance  of the unregulated
market over  the long run.
The spectrum of feed grain prices exhibits
more  power  at  all  frequencies  under  ob-
served  regulation  than  in  the  unregulated
market,  which suggests that the lesser volatil-
ity  of these  prices  allowed  policymakers  to
trade  stability  for  other goals.  Policy  6  pro-
duces  almost the same feed grain price spec-
trum  as the unregulated market.  That is,  the
stabilization  effort  under  optimal  control
deals  with  the  fluctuation  of wheat  prices,
rather than  with  the  smaller  fluctuations  of
feed  grain prices. 16
Policy  7,  which takes  into account current
supply  and export  fluctuations,  reduces  the
power  spectrum  of wheat  and  feed  grain
prices  over all the frequency domain.  Again,
most  of  the  improvement  is  attained  by
stabilizing  wheat prices.
16Further stabilization of feed grain prices would require
increasing the weight assigned  to its  MSD,  or decreas-
ing the  weights  assigned  to  the MSD  of  the  instru-
ments.  The  stabilization  of  feed  grain  and  livestock
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Concluding Remarks
This  paper  has  shown  how  methods  of
stochastic  control  and  dynamic  analysis  can
be applied to perform  comprehensive  policy
analyses of commodity markets.  A number of
substantive results were  derived for the case
of the  U.S.  grain market.  The  difference  in
the  aggregate  domestic  consumer  and  pro-
ducer surplus  produced  by  the unregulated
market  and  surplus  maximizing  policies  is
small and probably within the margin of error
of  this  study.  Moreover,  domestic  surplus
stayed at the same  level over a wide range of
policies,  suggesting  that other goals  may  be
pursued without reducing surplus.  This is an
important implication  in view of the fact that
the unregulated  market version of the model
results  in declining and  volatile  grain prices
and farm income.  In fact,  it was verified that
policies  directed  to  stabilizing  prices  and
maintaining  farm  income  do  not  reduce
domestic  surplus.  Furthermore,  it was found
that price stabilization and farm income  sup-
port can be attained by mixtures of inventory
and  grain disposal  management  but  that in-
1  1  1  1  1
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----  historical  policies
..... free  market
ventory management  alone  results  in an  ex-
cessive accumulation  of stocks.  A characteri-
zation  of historical  policies  toward  the  U.S.
grain market was found to have destabilizing
effects  on  the  market  model.  Finally,  the
power  spectra of grain  prices under optimal
stabilization  are  significantly  below  those
produced  by  historical  policies  and  by  the
unregulated  market.
Some  of  the  limitations  of  the  present
study should be pointed out.  An obvious one
is  the  rudimentary  nature  of  the  model
utilized. In particular, the supply response of
risk averse farmers  who face price  instability
and  government  regulation  may  not  be
adequately  modelled  by  the  usual  specifi-
cations.  Furthermore,  private  inventory and
grain  supply  depend  on  expectations  about
future spot prices,  which  are in turn a func-
tion  of government  policy.  Albeit  crudely,
our  model  takes  this  dependency  into  ac-
count.  However,  in view of Lucas'  observa-
tions,  it appears desirable to check the policy
implications of the present paper by estimat-
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hypothesis  that  expectations  are  formed  ra-
tionally.  It should be noted that,  contrary to
Kydland and Prescott's claim, optimal control
theory is  still appropriate when current deci-
sions of economic  agents depend on expecta-
tions of  future policy actions.  This  point has
been clearly demonstrated  by  Chow  (1978).
Finally,  the  present paper has not evaluated
the  distributional  effects  of price  stabiliza-
tion.  It seems that such an evaluation  should
be  made  using  a  more  general  nonlinear
specification of the market model. While the
desirability  of  overall  price  stabilization
seems  to hold rather  generally  [Samuelson],
the  distribution  of welfare  gains  has  been
shown  to  be highly  sensitive  to the  form  of
the supply and demand functions and the na-
ture  of  the  stochastic  disturbances  [Tur-
novsky  (1976),  (1978)].
References
Arzac,  E.  R.,  "An  Econometric  Evaluation  of Stabiliza-
tion  Policies  for  the  U.S.  Grain  Market,"  Research
Paper  No.  174,  Center  For Food Policy  Studies,  Co-
lumbia University,  December  1977.
Arzac,  E.  R.  and  M.  Wilkinson,  "A  Quarterly
Econometric  Model  of  the  United  States  Livestock
and Feed Grain Markets and Some of Its Policy Impli-
cations," American  Journal  of Agricultural  Economics,
(1979a):  (in press).
Arzac,  E.  R.  and  M.  Wilkinson,  "Stabilization  Policies
for United States Feed Grain and Livestock Markets,"
Journal of  Economic  Dynamics  and  Control,
1,(1979b):  (in press).
Bailey,  W.  R.,  Kutish,  F.  A.,  and  Rojko,  A.  S.,  "Grain
Stock  Issues  and  Alternatives,"  Economic  Research
Service,  U.S.D.A.,  Washington,  1974.
Chow,  G.  C.,  Analysis  and Control of Dynamic  Eco-
nomic Systems, Wiley  New York,  1975.
Chow,  G.  C.,  "Econometric  Policy  Evaluation and Op-
timization  Under  Rational  Expectations,"  Research
Memorandum  No.  225,  Econometric  Research  Pro-
gram,  Princeton  University,  1978.
Cromarty,  W.  A.,  "An  Econometric  Model  of  the
United  States  Agriculture,"  Journal of American
Statistical  Association, 54 (1959):  556-574.
Egbert,  A.  C.,  "An Aggregate  Model  of Agriculture -
Empirical  Estimates  and  Some  Policy  Implications,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,  51
(1969):  71-86.
Eaton,  D.  J.,  and Steele,  W.  S. (eds.)Analyses of Grain
Reserves,  A  Proceedings, E.R.S.  Report  No.  634,
U.S.D.A.,  Washington,  August  1976.
Fair,  R.  C.,  "The Estimation  of Simultaneous  Equation
Models With Lagged Endogenous  Variables  and First
Order  Serially Correlated  Errors,"  Econometrica, 38
(1970):  507-516.
Fisher,  F.  T., The Identification  Problem in Economet-
rics, McGraw-Hill,  New  York,  1966.
Fox,  F.,  and  Wells,  O.  V.,  Reserve Levels for Storable
Farm  Products, Senate  Document No.  130,  U. S. Con-
gress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
Washington,  1952.
Gustafson,  R.  L.,  Carryover Levels for Grains, Techni-
cal  Bulletin  No.  1178,  U.S.  Department  of Agricul-
ture,  Washington,  1958.
Hillman,  J.,  Johnson,  D. G.,  and Gray,  R.,  "Food  Re-
serve  Policies  for World Food  Security: A Consultant
Study  on Alternative  Approaches,"  ESC:  CSP/75/2,
Food  and  Agricultural  Organization,  Rome,  January
1975.
Hooper,  P. and T.  Underwood,  "A Quarterly  Forecast-
ing Model of U.S.  Agricultural Prices and Export Vol-
umes  - Progress  Report,"  International  Division,
Federal  Reserve  Board,  1977.
Hotelling,  H.,  "The  General  Welfare  in  Relation  to
Problems  of  Taxation  and  of  Railway  and  Utility
Rates,"  Econometrica, 6  (1938):  242-269.
Houck,  J.  P.,  and  M.  E.  Ryan,  "Supply  Analysis  for
Corn  in  the  United  States:  The Impact  of Changing
Government Programs," American Journal  of Agricul-
tural  Economics, 54 (1972)  184-191.
Houck,  J.  P.,  M.  E.  Ryan,  and A.  Subotnik,  Soybeans
and Their Products, University  of  Minnesota  Press,
Minneapolis,  1972.
Johnson,  D.  G.,  Farm Commodity Programs, American
Enterprise Institute,  Washington,  1973.
Johnston,  J.,  Econometric  Methods,  2nd.  Ed.,
McGraw-Hill,  New York,  1972.
Kydland,  F.  E.  and  E.  C.  Prescott,  "Rules  Rather  than
Discretion:  The  Inconsistency  of  Optimal  Plans,"
Journal  of Political  Economy,  85  (1977):  473-491.
21
ArzacWestern Journal  of Agricultural  Economics
Labys,  W.  C.,  and  C.  W.  J.  Granger,  Speculation,
Hedging,  and  Commodity  Price Forecasts, Heath
Lexington,  Lexington,  1970.
Lucas,  R.  E.,  Jr.,  "Econometric  Policy  Evaluation:  A
Critique,"  in  K.  Brunner  and  A.  H.  Meltzer  (eds.),
The  Phillips Curve  and Labor Markets,  North-
Holland,  Amsterdam,  1976.
Nerlove,  M.,  The Dynamics of Supply,  Johns  Hopkins
Press,  Baltimore,  1958.
Pindyck,  R.  S.,  Optimal Planning  for Economic Stabili-
zation,  North-Holland,  Amsterdam,  1973.
Rausser,  G.  C.,  "Active  Learning,  Control Theory,  and
Agricultural  Policy," American  Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 60  (1978):  476-490.
Rausser,  G.  C.  and  J.  W.  Freebairn,  "Approximate
Adaptive  Control  Solutions  to  U.S.  Beef  Trade  Pol-
icy," Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 3
(1974):  177-203.
Ray,  D.  E.,  and  R.  F.  Moriak,  "POLYSIM:  A National
Agricultural  Policy Simulation, Agricultural  Economic
Research,  28 (1976):  14-21.
Ryan,  M.  E.,  and M.  E. Abel,  "Corn Acreage  Response
in the Set-Aside  Program," Agricultural  Economic Re-
search, 24 (1972):  102-112.
Samuelson,  P.  A.,  "The Consumer  Does  Benefit  From
Feasible  Price  Stability,"  Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 86  (1972)  476-493.
Schienbein,  A.,  "Cost of Storing and Handling Grain  in
Commercial  Elevators,  Projections  for 1974/75,"  The
Feed Situation,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,
February  1974,  31-41.
Talpaz,  H.  and C.  R.  Taylor,  "Optimal Wheat Reserves
in  the  United  States,"  Department  of  Agricultural
Economics,  Texas A&M  University,  1977.
Theil,  H.,  Economic Forecase and Policy,  North-
Holland,  Amsterdam,  1961.
Tomek,  W.  G.,  and  R.  W.  Gray,  "Temporal  Relation-
ship  Among  Prices  on Commodity  Futures  Markets:
Their  Allocative  and Stabilizing Role,"  Food Research
Institute Studies,  7  (1967):  343-369.
Turnovsky,  S. J.,  "The  Distribution  of  Welfare  Gains
From  Price  Stabilization:  The  Case  of Multiplicative
Disturbances,"  International Economic  Review,  17
(1976):  133-148.
Turnovsky,  S. J.,  "The  Distribution  of  Welfare  Gains
From Price  Stabilization:  A Survey of Some Theoreti-
cal  Issues,"  in  F.  G.  Adams  and  S.  Klein  (eds.),
Stabilizing World  Commodity  Market,  Lexington
Books,  Lexington,  1978.
Tweeten,  L.  G.,  "The  Demand for  United  States  Farm
Output,"  Food Research Institute Studies,  7  (1967):
343-369.
Tweeten,  L.  G.,  Kalbfleisch,  D.,  and  Lu,  Y. C.,  An
Economic Analysis of Carryover  Policies  for the United
States Wheat Industry, Technical Bulletin, T-132,  Ag-
ricultural  Experiment  Station,  Oklahoma  State  Uni-
versity,  1971.
Waugh,  F.  W.,  "Reserve  Stocks of  Farm Products,"  in
National  Advisory  Commission  on  Food  and  Fiber,
Agricultural  Policy: A Review of Programs  and Needs,
Vol.  V.,  Washington,  1967,  3-52.
Working,  H.,  "Quotations  on  Commodity  Futures  as
Price  Forecasts,"  Econometrica, 10 (1942):  39-52.
U. S.  Department  of Agriculture,  Agricultural Statis-
tics,  Washington,  1947-75.
U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Wheat  Situation,
Washington,  1947-75.
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,  Feed Situation,
Washington,  1947-75.
U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Survey of Current
Business, Washington,  1947-75.
22
July 1979